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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect of financial leverage on corporate operating performance and 
how this effect varies across countries. Results for 10,375 firms in 39 countries indicate that 
the performance of firms with greater leverage is significantly reduced compared to their 
competitors in industry downturns, in line with the importance of financial distress costs. 
However, this effect varies according to the legal origin of the countries, being positive in 
French civil law countries. The protection of shareholder rights and the strength of legal 
enforcement are the main variables explaining the effect of financial leverage on 
performance. 
JEL classification: G18, G32. 
Keywords: leverage, operating performance, legal origin, investor protection, legal 
enforcement.
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Leverage and corporate performance: International evidence 
The financial literature has traditionally analyzed the relationship between leverage and 
corporate performance from the point of view of how corporate performance affects the 
level of firm debt. Most studies have revealed a negative relation. This result is consistent 
with the pecking order theory for the reason that higher profitability increases the 
possibility of retaining earnings and reduces the need for debt. 
In this paper, we address the question of the relationship between leverage and corporate 
performance from the perspective of how financial leverage affects the operating 
performance of firms. Previous work has both argued that financial distress is costly 
(Warner, 1977; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998) and that it can 
improve corporate performance due to the disciplinary role of debt (Jensen, 1989; Wruck, 
1990). Opler and Titman (1994) have provided evidence on how financial leverage affects 
corporate performance. Their results show that, during downturns, more highly leveraged 
firms tend to lose market share and experience lower operating profits than their 
competitors. This evidence is consistent with the view that the costs of financial distress are 
greater than the potential benefits of debt. 
Our aim is to analyze how leverage affects firm operating performance in industry 
downturns in different institutional environments bearing in mind that the importance of 
financial distress costs and the disciplinary role played by debt may vary between countries. 
In order to minimize the problem of reverse causality between corporate operating 
performance and financial distress, we follow the line of research designed by Opler and 
Titman (1994). We identify industries that have experienced economic distress and 
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investigate whether firms in those industries with high prior financial leverage fare 
differently from their less leveraged counterparts. 
We use an international panel database of 10,375 firms in 39 developing and developed 
countries over the period 1995-2004. The availability of an international database allows us 
to analyze how the effect of leverage on corporate operating performance varies across 
countries. Our paper makes several main contributions. First, we analyze the effect of 
leverage on operating performance in an international context. The use of an international 
sample allows an enhancement of previous research given that financial distress costs and 
the role of debt as a mechanism of control vary between countries. Second, we analyze how 
legal origin and financial structure and development influence the effect of leverage on 
corporate operating performance. Third, we study whether the differences in the effect of 
leverage on firm operating performance are a function of the level of investor protection 
and legal enforcement. Finally, we account for dynamic processes using the generalized-
method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for 
dynamic panel data. GMM models are designed to handle autoregressive properties in the 
dependent variable and control for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables and 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics. We include country and industry dummies to 
prevent the coefficients of supervisory and institutional variables from being biased by the 
incorporation of confusing effects from other omitted country variables. 
Our results indicate that the operating performance of more leveraged firms is significantly 
reduced compared to their competitors as a consequence of industry downturns, in line 
with the results provided by Opler and Titman (1994) for US firms. However, these effects 
vary across countries, depending on their legal origin. In the opposite sense to the results 
 4 
for the total sample, leverage in French civil law countries has a positive effect on operating 
performance in industry downturns. The results also show that the protection of 
shareholder rights and the strength of legal enforcement explain these differences in the 
results. However, the protection of creditor rights does not seem to be relevant. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the influence of leverage on 
corporate operating performance and the hypotheses tested in the paper. Section II 
describes the database, methodology, and main variables used in the paper. Section III 
discusses the empirical results. Section IV tests the robustness of our results. Finally, Section 
V provides the conclusions drawn. 
I. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The potential influence of leverage on firm performance will depend on two opposing 
effects. On the one hand, it has been more frequently argued that financial distress is costly 
and constitutes an important determinant of corporate capital structure. Financial distress 
has both direct and indirect costs. Distressed firms incur direct expenses for lawyers, 
financial advisers and accountants, among others. Since Warner (1977), different papers 
have estimated the direct costs of reorganizing firms, mainly in Chapter 11. Most of the 
evidence shows that the direct costs of distress are relatively small. Altman and Hotchkiss 
(2006) survey different studies that estimate the direct costs of financial distress. For 
instance, Bris et al. (2006) document direct costs of on average 8.1% (median 2%) of pre-
bankruptcy assets for a sample of 225 smaller firms. Indirect costs, such as suboptimal 
investment policies or inefficient asset sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) due to insufficient 
liquidity and limited ability to obtain financing, or lost sales driven by the firm’s 
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deteriorating financial condition (Opler and Titman, 1994) and lack of management 
attention to the business itself, are believed to be more important. These costs are, 
however, unobservable and therefore more challenging to estimate. Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) report that distressed firms cut capital expenditures, sell assets, and delay 
restructuring of filing for Chapter 11 in a way that appears to be costly. In fact, they 
estimate losses in value given distress in the order of 10% to 23% of pre-distress firm value.  
Financial distress is also costly because it may provide an incentive to make decisions that 
are harmful to creditors and other stakeholders such as customers, employees, and 
suppliers. Moreover, it also implies potential aggressive behavior by competitors aimed at 
obtaining a greater market share. 
On the other hand, it has likewise been argued that debt can improve the value of a firm 
because it forces managers to take value-maximizing decisions. Jensen (1986) and Stulz 
(1990) emphasize the disciplinary role of debt. Debt reduces the agency costs of free cash 
flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. 
Additionally, via the threat caused by failure, debt may serve as an effective motivating 
force to make firms more efficient. Several authors also stress the benefits of financial 
distress and its positive effect on internal capital markets and organizational efficiency 
(Jensen, 1989; Wruck, 1990). Wruck (1990) suggests that debt may serve as a valuable 
driver for operational and organizational change. Financial distress may thus entail benefits 
such as anticipated changes in management, corporate governance, and organization 
strategy and structure. Lang et al. (1996) have provided evidence in line with the idea that 
firm leverage might be beneficial for shareholders, limiting the growth for low-q firms. 
Gilson (1989) finds that executives in financially distressed firms are more likely to lose their 
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jobs than their counterparts in firms that are not financially distressed. Hence, although 
lower financial leverage may reduce the costs of financial distress, important benefits are 
foregone by the suboptimal use of debt financing. 
As a consequence, the net effect of leverage on firm performance will be the result of the 
stronger of these effects. If financial distress is costly and more important than the 
disciplinary role of debt, then firms with more debt will have the greatest operating 
difficulties in a downturn. Conversely, if financial distress benefits firms by forcing efficient 
operating changes to a greater extent than the costs of financial distress, then firms with 
more debt will perform better than less leveraged firms. This was the idea tested by Opler 
and Titman (1994) for US firms. Their results show that highly leveraged firms tend to lose 
market share and experience lower operating profits than their competitors. This implies 
that the costs of financial distress more than counterweigh the benefits for US firms. 
Bankruptcy law and related out-of-court mechanisms provide a general structure that helps 
claimholders resolve conflicts that arise when the firm defaults on its debt payments. 
Moreover, bankruptcy law also determines the allocation of control over the distressed firm 
to its diverse claimholders. The design of bankruptcy procedures varies widely throughout 
the world. Some countries have laws that address the continuation of the firm as an 
ongoing business. This is the case of the United States and France, for example. Other 
countries, like the UK or Sweden, have procedures aimed at allocating the distressed firm’s 
assets. The relative efficiency of the existing alternatives that govern financial distress has 
constituted an important academic issue. Institutional aspects of countries such as the 
protection of creditor interest, the magnitude of the potential inefficiencies in different 
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bankruptcy systems or the efficiency of the judicial system may affect the costs of financial 
distress. 
La Porta et al. (1998) provide evidence consistent with the idea that countries develop 
substitute mechanisms for poor investor protection. For instance, ownership concentration 
in civil law countries is a response to poor investor protection. Concentration of ownership 
of a firm’s shares is normally efficient in providing managers with incentives to work and 
large investors with incentives to monitor the managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). When other control mechanisms fail, debt may play an active 
role as another adaptive response to poor investor protection. Jiraporn et al. (2012) show 
that leverage substitutes for corporate governance in alleviating agency conflicts. 
Since both the costs and benefits of financial distress may vary with the institutional 
characteristics of individual countries, it is worth analyzing how leverage influences 
corporate operating performance. This paper analyses the link between financial distress 
and corporate finance around the world. The paper tests whether firms with more debt are 
more likely to experience performance losses in industry downturns than other firms, 
taking into account the legal origin and the institutional characteristics of the countries. 
II. Database and methodology 
Our source for firm data is the Worldscope database, which contains financial statement 
data and stock prices from many countries in comparable form. We initially selected the 49 
countries considered by La Porta et al. (1998) over the period 1995-2004, but eliminated 10 
of them because of lack of data: Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The number of countries finally considered is therefore 
 8 
39, including both developed and developing countries. We excluded financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 – 6999). Seeing as we apply the GMM first-difference estimator with one lag of 
the dependent variable, the number of firms included in the paper is 10,375 with 40,886 
firm-year observations. 
The first step in the study is the definition of “economically distressed industries”. An 
industry (3-digit SIC level) is considered economically distressed if its median sales growth is 
negative and its median stock returns are below -30 percent. Other less strict criteria have 
also been considered and the results obtained are similar. 
Appendix A describes how we define the variables used in the empirical analysis and their 
sources. Firm performance has been measured by changes in operating performance 
relative to industry averages, where changes in firm operating performance are industry 
adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. The measure of 
operating performance is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and 
taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) and 
total assets. The change in firm performance is measured in each year as the growth in 
operating performance from one year before until one year after (from year -1 to year +1). 
Financial leverage is measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance as 
the ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term debt) and the book 
value of total assets. This ratio has been adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry 
leverage ratio in each year. Highly leveraged firms are those firms with a higher leverage 
ratio than the mean of the industry in each year. On the one hand, the use of book values 
rather than market values of financial leverage avoids the problem that the market value of 
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equity may forecast future operating performance. On the other hand, the prior measure of 
financial leverage seeks to avoid the effect resulting from the increase in borrowing of 
poorly performing firms.  
Our firm control variables are similar to those used by Opler and Titman (1994). We control 
for size, asset sales, investment rates and profitability. The control for asset sales allows us 
to reduce the effect of divestitures on sales. Investment rates and profitability can be 
important determinants of sales growth. 
Table I provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. Panel A describes all 
the firms included in the sample. Panel B to Panel E present the descriptive statistics 
according to legal origin. The mean (median) leverage of the sample is 22.64 (20.36) 
percent. Countries of Germanic legal origin present the highest leverage; in fact the mean 
(median) is 27.18 (25.78) percent. Leverage ratios are quite similar for countries of UK, 
French or Scandinavian legal origin. 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE  
We apply generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic 
models of panel data by Arellano and Bond (1991). This methodology is specifically designed 
to address three particular econometric issues: (i) the presence of unobserved firm-specific 
effects, eliminated by taking first differences of the variables; (ii) the autoregressive process 
in the data regarding operating performance; and (iii) the likely endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. We control for the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables in 
the GMM estimations by using two- to four-period lags of the same variables as 
instruments. The country and the dummy variables are initially considered exogenous. 
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We use one-step estimation and specify the robust estimator of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the parameters. We also examine the hypothesis that there is no second-order 
serial correlation in the first-difference residuals (m2). In our models, this hypothesis of the 
absence of second-order serial correlation is not rejected. First-order serial correlation (m1) 
in the differentiated residuals is attributable to the first difference of models. We report 
results using one lag of the dependent variable. 
III. Results 
A. Leverage and corporate performance in economic downturns 
Table II presents the results of the effect of leverage on firm performance, and whether this 
effect is greater when industries experience poor performance. Column (1) in Table II 
highlights the estimated coefficient when economic downturns in the industries are not 
considered. The effect of leverage on firm performance is negative. This negative coefficient 
suggests that highly leveraged firms experience a loss in operating performance compared 
to their more conservatively financed competitors even in non-distressed situations. 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE  
The distressed industry dummy (DID) and the interaction of this dummy with firm leverage 
(LEVxDID) have been included in column (2). The sign of the coefficients of the control 
variables and their statistical significance do not change when these two variables are 
included. The coefficients obtained for variables DID and LEVxDID are statistically significant 
and respectively positive and negative. The influence of leverage on firm operating 
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performance is negative, although the coefficient is not statistically significant at standard 
levels. 
The positive coefficient of the economically distressed industry dummy (DID) implies that 
industry downturns generate a positive influence on corporate performance regardless of 
the level of leverage. On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction variable between 
firm leverage and the distressed industry dummy is negative, in line with the idea that the 
negative effect of leverage on firm operating performance is greater when industries 
experience poor performance. The impact of financial leverage on corporate operating 
performance is economically important. Since the variables have been standardized, using 
the coefficient in column (2) in Table II a one-standard deviation increase in industry-
adjusted firm leverage for firms in an economically distressed industry would cause a 
decrease in the dependent variable with respect a non-distressed industry of 5.54 times its 
mean value. Due to the large standard deviation of the dependent variable (VOP), this 
represents 4.79 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
This result is likewise maintained when using a dummy variable to identify a firm as being 
highly leveraged, rather than a continuous variable.1 In column (3), LEV is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the deciles 8 to 10 of leverage, and 0 
otherwise. According to the results presented, a one-standard deviation increase in 
industry-adjusted leverage for firms belonging to leverage deciles 8 to 10 (0.3906) in an 
economically distressed industry would cause a decrease in the dependent variable with 
respect a non-distressed industry of 5.62 times its mean value. 
                                                 
 
1 This allows us to consider that the relation between leverage and firm operating performance could be 
nonlinear. 
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The results obtained do not vary when the dummy variable for a distressed industry is 
defined in a different way. Columns (4) and (5) show the results when we consider a less 
strict definition of industry downturn. DID is measured in column (4) as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry (3-digit SIC industry) is 
negative and when it experiences median stock returns below -20 percent. Similarly, DID in 
column (5) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the 
industry is negative and when the industry suffers median stock returns of below -10 
percent. 
On the one hand, the coefficients of DID shown in columns (4) and (5) are positive, being 
consistent with firms belonging to an industry undergoing a downturn experiencing a 
positive effect on future operating performance regardless of their level of leverage. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of the interaction variable between firm leverage and the 
distressed industry dummy is negative, indicating that the effect of leverage on firm 
performance is greater when industries experience poor performance. 
Summing up, the main result brought to light by the estimations in Table II is that the effect 
of leverage on firm performance is greater when industries suffer an economic downturn. If 
leverage is high, an economic downturn has a negative influence on firm operating 
performance. Moreover, firms that undergo a downturn also experience a positive effect on 
their future operating performance regardless of the level of leverage. Finally, although 
highly leveraged firms experience a loss in operating performance compared to their more 
conservatively financed competitors even in non-distressed situations, the effect is not 
statistically significant. These results are similar to those obtained by Opler and Titman 
(1994) for US firms. 
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B. Leverage and corporate performance according to legal origin and financial structure and 
development 
The results presented in Table III analyze the effect of leverage on firm performance when 
industries experience poor performance according to the legal origin of the country. LEV is 
measured as the industry-adjusted financial debt ratio in each year and the dummy of 
distressed industry is defined in the strictest way in the estimations carried out from this 
point on. 
The results show that the legal origin of the country influences the effect of leverage on 
corporate operating performance. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the countries 
with a common law and civil law origin, respectively. These results are significantly different. 
In common law countries, we obtain a similar sign of the influences of the dummy variable 
for a distressed industry and of its interaction with the level of debt compared to the results 
shown in Table II.2 However, the results shown in column (2) for civil law countries reveal 
that there is no effect of leverage on firm operating performance in industries with poor 
performance. This implies that the effect of leverage on operating performance when 
industries experience poor performance depends on the legal origin of the country. 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE  
In order to analyze this difference in the results between common and civil law countries in 
greater detail, we divided the civil law countries into those of French, Germanic and 
Scandinavian legal origin. Columns (3) to (5) respectively show the results for these groups. 
                                                 
 
2 This estimation has to be considered with caution, as it presents positive levels of autocorrelation in m2. 
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There is no significant effect of leverage on operating performance in industry downturns 
for countries of Germanic or Scandinavian legal origin, in line with the results for civil law 
countries. However, the results change significantly when we refer to countries of French 
legal origin. According to the estimations in column (3), the effect of leverage on operating 
performance is negative when there is no economic downturn in the industry. This effect is 
in line with financial distress costs outweighing the benefits of the disciplinary role of debt 
and suggests that the operating performance of more leveraged firms is significantly 
reduced compared to their competitors even in good times.  
Furthermore, the effect of leverage on corporate operating performance is positive when a 
prior economic downturn has taken place in the industry. The higher the prior firm leverage 
in countries of French legal origin, the higher the firm operating performance in the case of 
an economic downturn. This result seems to reveal the different pattern of French legal 
origin insofar as financial distress seems to benefit firms by forcing efficient operating 
changes.  
The same conclusions are obtained when we compare the results between countries of 
French legal origin and the remaining countries using a dummy variable. Column (6) shows 
the results when the variables LEV, DID and LEVxDID are considered in themselves and also 
when multiplied by a dummy variable (LOF) that takes the value of 1 if the country is of 
French legal origin, and 0 otherwise. The variables LEVxLOF, DIDxLOF and LEVxDIDxLOF 
capture the differential effect of variables LEV, DID and LEVxDID for countries of French 
legal origin. Thus, LEVxDIDxLOF in column (6) indicates the difference in the impact of 
leverage on corporate operating performance when industries experience poor 
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performance in countries of French legal origin compared to this effect in countries of UK, 
Germanic or Scandinavian legal origin. 
The results in column (6) highlight the existence of a positive influence of the dummy 
variable DID and a negative effect of leverage on corporate operating performance in 
industry downturns. These results are the same as those shown in Table II. In addition, when 
we interact the dummy variable of French legal origin (LOF) with the variables DID and 
LEVxDID, the coefficients thus obtained are respectively negative and positive. The positive 
coefficient of LEVxDIDxLOF suggests that the beneficial effects of debt on corporate 
operating performance are more substantial in countries of French legal origin. 
Economically, being a country with a French legal origin has a considerable impact on 
changes in operating performance adjusted by industry. A one-standard deviation increase 
in industry-adjusted firm leverage for firms in an economically distressed industry in a 
country with a French legal origin would cause an increase in the dependent variable with 
respect to a non-distressed industry of 19.77 times its mean value. This variation represents 
17.12 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that countries develop substitute mechanisms for poor investor 
protection. The higher disciplinary role of debt in countries of French legal origin may be the 
consequence of the deficient functioning of other control mechanisms in these countries. In 
this context, debt seems to operate as a disciplinary mechanism in the greater 
concentration of debt ownership. 
We have also analyzed whether the financial structure and development of the country 
have any influence on the effect of leverage on firm operating performance. As a measure 
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of the financial structure of the country, we have considered three proxies: (1) the variable 
STRUCT, which measures the market orientation of the financial system; (2) the dummy 
variable MARKET, which takes the value of 1 if the country has a market-oriented system, 
and 0 otherwise; and (3) the variable BANK WEIGHT, which is the ratio between the private 
credit by deposit money banks and the value of listed shares. 
The results obtained for the three proxies of financial structure (FS) are shown in columns 
(1) to (3) in Table IV. Columns (1) and (2) present the results when the variables used to 
distinguish the financial structure of the country are STRUCT and MARKET, respectively. 
Higher values of both variables indicate a greater degree of stock market development 
compared to the development of the banking system. Column (3) shows the results for the 
variable BANK WEIGHT. Higher values of this variable imply a greater weight of the banking 
system compared to the development of the stock market. 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE  
The negative coefficient of LEVxDIDxFS in columns (1) and (2) and its positive coefficient in 
column (3) reveal that the operating performance of more leveraged firms in economies 
with a higher degree of stock market development compared to the development of the 
banking system is reduced compared to their competitors as a consequence of industry 
downturns. The higher the weight of financial markets, the lower the benefits of debt and 
the greater the predominance of financial distress costs. 
An additional aspect to the financial structure of the country is the degree of concentration 
of its banking system. Seeing as higher bank concentration could influence debt 
concentration, it should accordingly affect the disciplinary role of debt. We have considered 
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whether bank concentration influences the relationship between leverage and operating 
performance. We follow Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) and measure 
bank concentration (BC) as the fraction of bank assets held by the three largest commercial 
banks in the country. The variable BC is interacted with LEV, DID and LEVxDID to consider 
what the differential effect of leverage on firm operating performance is when bank 
concentration is high. 
The positive coefficient of LEVxDIDxBC in column (4) shows that the operating performance 
of the more leveraged firms in economies with a higher bank concentration increases 
compared to their competitors as a consequence of industry downturns. This result is 
consistent with the greater predominance of benefits of debt in more concentrated banking 
systems. 
The next step is to analyze the role of financial development in the relationship between 
leverage and corporate performance. As a measure of the financial development (FD) of the 
economies under study, we have considered two proxies: (1) the variable FINAN, which 
measures the country’s financial development; and (2) the dummy variable DEVELOP, which 
takes the value of 1 if the country’s financial system is developed, and 0 otherwise. The 
results for these two variables are presented in columns (5) and (6) in Table IV. According to 
the coefficient of the variable LEVxDIDxFD in column (5), the negative influence of leverage 
on firm operating performance when an industry downturn takes place is only characteristic 
of financially developed economies. In line with the previous results, this could be the 
consequence of the lesser relevance of the disciplinary role of debt in more financially 
developed countries, insofar as other mechanisms exist to protect investors. In financially 
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underdeveloped economies, the benefits of debt counterweigh the negative influence of 
financial distress costs. 
C. Leverage and corporate performance according to institutional and legal characteristics 
In this section, we investigate whether the differences in the results according to legal origin 
and financial structure and development are related to the protection of investor rights and 
legal enforcement. La Porta et al. (1998) show that there are important differences between 
common law and civil law countries in terms of aspects such as investor protection and legal 
enforcement. We next analyze whether or not these differences explain the different results 
between common law and civil law countries shown in Table III and between financial 
structure and development of countries shown in Table IV. 
C.1. Influence of the protection of creditor rights 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2007) show that common law countries protect 
creditors the most, while French civil law countries protect them the least. German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries are situated in between. In fact, the mean country values 
for our sample are the following (see Table I): 2.5 is the mean value of creditor rights for 
common law countries; 1.33 for French civil law countries; 2.33 for German civil law 
countries and 1.75 for Scandinavian civil law countries. Since the protection of creditor 
rights is one of the main differences between countries when considering the legal origin of 
the country, we have analyzed whether this aspect influences the relationship between 
financial leverage and firm operating performance.  
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To do so, we have used the creditor rights index compiled by Djankov et al. (2007). This 
index measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors and follows the index 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998), although in the former case the creditor rights index is 
constructed in January each year. Higher values indicate stronger creditor rights or stronger 
protection against borrower expropriation. 
The results presented in Table V analyze the effect of leverage on firm performance in 
industry downturns according to the protection of creditor rights. This effect has been 
analyzed by multiplying the main variables in the estimation by the value of the protection 
of creditor rights. Three new variables have been included in column (1) which are the result 
of multiplying LEV, DID and LEVxDID by the protection of creditor rights (CRED). None of 
these three new variables has a significant coefficient. This suggests that the protection of 
creditor rights is not a determinant of the effect of leverage on corporate operating 
performance. Summing up, the protection of creditor rights is not the cause of the 
differences between common law and French civil law countries shown in Table III. 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE  
C.2. Influence of the protection of property rights 
La Porta et al. (1998) also show that common law countries have the relatively strongest 
and French civil law countries the weakest protection of shareholders. In fact, the mean 
country values of shareholder rights using the index designed by La Porta et al. (1997) 
(ANTIDIRECTOR) for our sample are the following: 4.29 is the mean value of protection of 
shareholder rights for common law countries; 2.53 for French civil law countries; 2.33 for 
German civil law countries and 3.00 for Scandinavian civil law countries. Seeing as the 
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protection of shareholder rights is another of the main differences between countries when 
considering the legal origin of the country, we have analyzed whether this aspect exerts an 
influence over the relationship between financial leverage and firm operating performance 
in industry downturns.  
We measure the protection of property rights by two different measures: (1) the index of 
shareholder rights elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998) (ANTIDIRECTOR); and (2) the index of 
private property rights published by the Heritage Foundation (RIGHTS). The first is an index 
that ranges from zero to six, a high score indicating greater legal protection of shareholder 
rights. The second is an annual indicator of the degree to which private property rights are 
protected and the degree to which the government enforces laws that protect private 
property. It also accounts for the possibility that private property may be expropriated, and 
analyzes the independence of the judiciary, corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of 
individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.  
The results presented in columns (2) and (3) in Table V analyze the effect of leverage on firm 
performance in industry downturns according to the protection of shareholder rights. This 
effect has been analyzed by multiplying the main variables in the estimation by the value of 
the protection of rights, in column (2) by ANTIDIRECTOR and in column (3) by RIGHTS. Three 
new variables have been included in these columns that are the result of multiplying LEV, 
DID and LEVxDID by the protection of shareholder rights, respectively. The results are 
qualitatively similar in both columns. 
When the interaction with the variable ANTIDIRECTOR is considered, the variable 
LEVxDIDxANTIDIRECTOR has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Thus, when 
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the protection of shareholder rights is high, there is a negative effect of leverage on the 
operating performance of firms compared to their more conservatively financed 
competitors. These results are upheld when the protection of rights is proxied by the 
protection of property rights in column (3). In column (2), a one-standard deviation increase 
in industry-adjusted firm leverage for firms in an economically distressed industry in a 
country with a high protection of shareholder rights would cause a decrease in the 
dependent variable with respect to a non-distressed industry of 10.56 times its mean value.   
In short, the results obtained when we consider the protection of shareholder rights show 
that the influence of the costs of financial distress is seen to predominate when the 
protection of shareholder rights is high. 
C.3. Influence of legal enforcement 
A strong system of legal enforcement could be a substitute for weak explicit legal protection 
of investors. Kuipers et al. (2009) find that a strong rule of law and security owner 
protection mechanisms may act as a substitute contracting mechanism for mitigating the 
classic agency costs of the firm. Hence, in our analysis we have considered the influence of 
legal enforcement on the relationship between leverage and firm operating performance. 
We use one of the proxies for the quality of legal enforcement used by La Porta et al. 
(1998); namely, the annual index of law and order of the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), which ranges from 0 to 10, with a higher value indicating better quality and 
enforcement of the legal system. La Porta et al. (1998) and the data shown in Table I suggest 
that the quality of law enforcement also differs across legal origin. Scandinavian countries 
clearly have a high level of legal enforcement (mean value of 9.82); with German civil law 
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countries close behind (mean value of 8.72). French civil law countries, on the other hand, 
have the lowest level of legal enforcement (mean value of 6.67). 
Column (4) in Table V presents the results of the influence of leverage on corporate 
operating performance in industry downturns according to the legal enforcement of the 
country. This effect has been analyzed by multiplying the main variables in the estimation by 
the value of legal enforcement (LE). Three new variables have been included in this column 
which are the result of multiplying LEV, DID and LEVxDID by legal enforcement (LE). 
The variable LEVxDID has a negative coefficient, in line with the idea that the costs outweigh 
the benefits of debt, although it is not statistically significant. However, when the 
interaction with the variable LE is considered, the variable LEVxDIDxLE has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. Thus, when there is a strong system of legal enforcement, 
a negative effect of leverage on the operating performance of firms exists compared to their 
more conservatively financed competitors. Using the coefficient in column (4) in Table IV, a 
one-standard deviation increase in industry-adjusted firm leverage for firms in an 
economically distressed industry in countries with a strong system of legal enforcement 
would cause a decrease in the dependent variable with respect to a non-distressed industry 
of 7.60 times its mean value. The results obtained show that, in the presence of a strong 
system of legal enforcement, the costs of financial distress are of greater importance than 
the benefits.  
As effective protection of rights requires both explicit legal protection and enforcement of 
the law, we interact the previously considered variables of protection of creditor and 
shareholder rights with the variable capturing law enforcement in the countries under study 
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(LE). The results are presented in columns (5) and (6) in Table V. In these columns, the 
variables of protection of creditor rights (CRED) and of shareholder rights (ANTIDIRECTOR) 
are multiplied by the variable of legal enforcement (LE)3. The results are similar to those 
obtained previously when only considering the variables of protection of investor rights. On 
the one hand, the results in column (5) are similar to the results in column (1) and are 
consistent with the idea that differences in the protection of creditor rights cannot explain 
the differences shown in Table III between French civil law countries and the remaining 
countries. 
On the other hand, the results in column (6) considering the interaction between the 
protection of shareholder rights and the enforcement of law are similar to the results in 
column (2). They suggest that, in countries with a low level of protection of shareholder 
rights and a weak system of legal enforcement, leverage has no influence on corporate 
operating performance when industries experience poor performance. In these cases, there 
is no clear predominance of the benefits and costs of debt. However, when the protection 
of shareholder rights and the system of legal enforcement are strong, leverage has a 
negative effect on firm operating performance when industries suffer a downturn. This is in 
line with the predominance of the importance of financial distress costs over the disciplinary 
role of debt when institutional quality is high. 
IV. Robustness 
                                                 
 
3 The variable RIGHTS is not multiplied by LE insofar as the former variable already considers the degree to 
which the government enforces laws. 
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In a further analysis, we test the robustness of our results. The main results obtained in the 
paper do not vary when the dummy variable for a distressed industry is defined in a 
different way. In columns (1) to (4) in Table VI, the same definition of distressed industry is 
used as in column (4) in Table II. DID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
median sales growth of the industry (3-digit SIC industry) is negative and when it 
experiences median stock returns below -20 percent. The main results of the paper, the 
estimations carried out in column (6) in Table III and columns (1), (2) and (4) in Table V, are 
now shown for this alternative definition of industry downturn.  
INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE 
On the one hand, the results shown in column (1) reveal the difference in the effect of 
leverage on corporate operating performance when industries experience poor 
performance in countries of French legal origin compared to this influence in countries of 
UK, Germanic or Scandinavian legal origin. The differential effect of the variables LEV, DID 
and LEVxDID is captured by the variables LEVxLOF, DIDxLOF and LEVxDIDxLOF. The results 
highlight the existence of a positive influence of the dummy variable DID and a negative 
effect of leverage on corporate operating performance in industry downturns, as in 
columns (2) to (5) in Table II. However, the positive coefficient of LEVxDIDxLOF suggests 
that the benefits of debt have more relevance in countries of French legal origin, as we 
obtained in column (6) in Table III. 
On the other hand, the results presented in column (2) reveal that the protection of 
creditor rights does not determine the effect of leverage on corporate operating 
performance. However, in line with the results shown in Table V, shareholder rights and 
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legal enforcement (columns (3) and (4), respectively) do have an influence on the effect of 
leverage on corporate operating performance in industry downturns. 
Columns (5) to (8) in Table VI shown the results for the estimations carried out in column 
(6) in Table III and columns (1), (2) and (4) in Table V when LEV is measured as a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the deciles 8 to 10 of leverage, and 0 
otherwise. The results are extremely similar to those discussed previously.  
Since there are differences in the level of leverage among countries, in Table VII the 
leverage ratio has been adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry leverage ratio for each 
country. The results reported in Table VII confirm all the previous findings. 
INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE  
The coefficient of the interaction variable between firm leverage adjusted by industry and 
country and the distressed industry dummy is negative (column (1) Table VII), highlighting 
that the negative effect of leverage on firm operating performance is greater when 
industries experience poor performance. Column (2) reveals that the benefits of debt have 
more importance in countries of French legal origin, insofar as the coefficient of 
LEVxDIDXLOF is positive. The results in Column (3) suggest that the protection of creditor 
rights is not a determinant of the effect of leverage on corporate operating performance. 
The coefficient of the interaction variable LEVxDIDxANTIDIRECTOR (Column (4)) is negative, 
in line with the existence of a negative effect of leverage on operating performance of firms 
compared to their more conservatively financed competitors in countries where the 
protection of shareholders is high. Column (5) shows that, when there is a strong system of 
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legal enforcement, a negative effect of leverage on the operating performance of firm exists 
compared to under-leveraged competitors. 
We also control for the potential endogeneity of firm leverage. We address this concern by 
using traditional determinants of capital structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), namely 
profitability, growth opportunities, tangible assets and size, as instruments for the leverage 
ratio.4 Instead of the observed values of the industry-adjusted leverage ratio, we use 
instruments to identify their exogenous component and to control for potential simultaneity 
bias. The results obtained using the fitted values of LEV are shown in Table VIII. 
INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE  
The results presented in columns (1) and (2) are similar to those discussed previously. In 
particular, the results in column (2) show that the benefits outweigh the costs of debt in 
countries of French legal origin. Column (3) shows that differences in the protection of 
creditor rights cannot explain the differences according to the legal origin of the country. 
Columns (4) and (5) reveal that the variable LEVxDID has a positive and significant 
coefficient, in favor of the greater weight of benefits of debt compared to financial distress 
costs. When the interaction with the variable ANTIDIRECTOR is considered, the variable 
LEVxDIDxANTIDIRECTOR has a negative coefficient. In this context, debt seems to play a role 
as a mechanism that forces efficient decisions when the protection of shareholder rights is 
low. However, if the protection of shareholders rights is high, the influence of the costs of 
financial distress is seen to predominate. Similar results are obtained in column (5) when 
                                                 
 
4 Booth et al, (2001) and Delcoure (2007), among others, support the importance of these variables in explaining 
the capital structure of firms in developing countries. 
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considering the variable LE. Benefits of debt predominate in countries with low levels of 
legal enforcement. In the presence of a strong system of legal enforcement, however, the 
results suggest the greater importance of the costs of financial distress. 
V. Conclusions 
We analyze the effect of leverage on corporate operating performance using a panel 
database of 10,375 firms in 39 countries. Our results show that firms with higher leverage 
ratios prior to the onset of industry economic distress experience a decline in operating 
profits consistent with the idea that there are significant indirect costs of financial distress 
that are greater than the control benefits of debt. However, this conclusion is far from being 
the same in all countries. 
The results show that the effect of leverage on firm operating performance varies with the 
legal origin and the financial structure and development of countries. As regards legal origin, 
the results for French civil law countries reveal a positive effect of leverage on operating 
performance when the industry has suffered a downturn. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that debt plays a different role in these countries, suggesting the predominance 
of the role of debt as a mechanism that may force efficient decisions by management. 
Furthermore, our results show that financial structure and development have an influence 
on the relationship between leverage and firm operating performance. The disciplinary role 
of debt is greater than financial distress costs in countries with a higher degree of 
development of the banking system compared to stock market development, in financially 
underdeveloped economies and in more concentrated banking systems. 
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The protection of shareholder rights and the system of legal enforcement are key variables 
for distinguishing when leverage has a negative or a positive effect on corporate operating 
performance when industries suffer an economic downturn. In countries with a high level of 
protection of shareholder rights and a strong system of legal enforcement, there is a 
negative effect of leverage on corporate operating performance when industries experience 
poor performance. This effect reveals the predominance of financial distress costs over the 
benefits of debt. The role of debt as a mechanism that may force efficient decisions is 
probably not unrelated to the negligible importance that other control mechanisms have 
when the protection of property rights and legal enforcement are weak. Other control 
mechanisms are effective in countries with a high protection of shareholder rights and a 
strong system of legal enforcement. In such contexts, the benefits of debt in terms of 
controlling firms are less relevant. 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Leverage is the ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and 
long-term debt) and the book value of total assets measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance. LEV is the 
industry-adjusted ratio of leverage in each year. LEV (dummy) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the 
deciles 8 to 10 of leverage, and 0 otherwise. Variation in operating performance (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before 
interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. 
CRED measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. ANTIDIRECTOR measures the legal protection of shareholder rights. 
RIGHTS is an index of the degree to which private property rights are protected. LE measures the enforcement of the legal system. Panel B 
to Panel E present the descriptive statistics of these variables according to legal origin. 
 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. First quartile Third quartile 
PANEL A Leverage (%) 22.64 20.36 18.90 7.10 34.79 
 LEV (%) 0.00 -2.31 17.76 -12.70 10.84 
 LEV (dummy) (%) 18.79 0 39.06 0 0 
Total VOP (%) -0.82 0.23 94.70 -4.30 4.58 
Sample CRED 1.95 2 1.10 1 3 
 ANTIDIRECTOR 3.18 3 1.35 2 4 
 RIGHTS 4.24 4.62 0.87 3.48 5 
 LE 7.77 7.95 1.97 6.28 9.48 
PANEL B Leverage (%) 20.92 18.25 19.59 4.51 32.91 
 LEV (%) -1.19 -3.75 18.37 -13.64 9.23 
 LEV (dummy) (%) 16.36 0 36.99 0 0 
Common law VOP (%) -0.58 0.07 63.50 -5.02 5.00 
legal origin CRED 2.5 3 1.16 1.25 3 
 ANTIDIRECTOR 4.29 4.50 0.91 4.00 5.00 
 RIGHTS 4.37 5 0.94 3.59 5 
 LE 7.95 8.59 1.81 6.76 9.38 
PANEL C Leverage (%) 21.19 19.00 16.08 8.05 31.63 
 LEV (%) -2.30 -4.14 15.48 -13.63 7.58 
 LEV (dummy) (%) 14.53 0 35.24 0 0 
French VOP (%) -0.32 0.12 53.98 -4.56 4.48 
legal origin CRED 1.33 1 0.90 1 2 
 ANTIDIRECTOR 2.53 3.00 1.29 2.00 3.00 
 RIGHTS 3.72 3.60 0.82 3.13 4 
 LE 6.67 6.52 2.00 5.56 7.91 
PANEL D Leverage (%) 27.18 25.78 18.57 11.70 40.37 
 LEV (%) 3.83 2.61 17.63 -10.16 16.01 
 LEV (dummy) (%) 26.23 0 43.99 0 1 
Germanic VOP (%) 0.91 0.48 153.93 -2.94 3.287 
legal origin CRED 2.33 2.50 0.82 2 3 
 ANTIDIRECTOR 2.33 2.00 1.03 2.00 2.75 
 RIGHTS 4.78 4.81 0.23 4.64 4.98 
 LE 8.72 9.37 1.33 7.89 9.45 
PANEL E Leverage (%) 21.03 17.02 17.64 6.09 33.33 
 LEV (%) -0.43 -.359 15.33 -10.92 9.49 
 LEV (dummy) (%) 18.61 0 38.92 0 0 
Scandinavian VOP (%) 0.69 0.53 38.76 -5.01 5.91 
legal origin CRED 1.75 1.50 0.96 1 2.25 
 ANTIDIRECTOR 3.00 3.00 0.82 2.75 3.25 
 RIGHTS 4.90 5 0.20 4.90 5 
 LE 9.82 9.80 0.07 9.79 9.83 
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Table II. Leverage and corporate performance 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales in each year. LEV is the industry-adjusted ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term 
debt) and the book value of total assets in each year measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance (Columns (1), 
(2), (4) and (5)). Alternatively, LEV has been measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the deciles 8 to 
10 of leverage, and 0 otherwise (Column (3)). DID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry 
at the 3-digit SIC level is negative and the median stock return is below -30 percent (Columns (2) and (3)), -20 percent (Column (4)) and -10 
percent (Column (5)). All the continuous variables have been standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.0916 (0.52) 
0.0918 
(0.84) 
0.0929 
(0.84) 
0.0918 
(0.84) 
0.0903 
(0.83) 
VOPt-1 
-0.4899*** 
(-40.21) 
-0.4898*** 
(-40.11) 
-0.4888*** 
(-39.36) 
-0.4899*** 
(-40.19) 
-0.4901*** 
(-40.28) 
SALES 0.7119*** (2.67) 
0.7007*** 
(2.66) 
0.7183*** 
(2.67) 
0.7015*** 
(2.68) 
0.7087*** 
(2.69) 
PROFIT 0.5525*** (12.85) 
0.5523*** 
(12.83) 
0.5521*** 
(12.89) 
0.5524*** 
(12.85) 
0.5524*** 
(12.86) 
INVEST 0.0622 (1.05) 
0.0602 
(1.02) 
0.0584 
(0.98) 
0.0606 
(1.02) 
0.0618 
(1.04) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.1130** (-2.01) 
-0.1113** 
(-1.98) 
-0.1148** 
(-2.08) 
-0.1122** 
(-2.00) 
-0.1124** 
(-2.01) 
LEV -0.0065* (-1.71) 
-0.0059 
(-1.54) 
-0.0031 
(-1.04) 
-0.0056 
(-1.43) 
-0.0054 
(-1.33) 
DID  0.1049*** (4.27) 
0.1232*** 
(4.57) 
0.0805*** 
(4.41) 
0.0475*** 
(3.23) 
LEV x DID  -0.0454*** (-2.60) 
-0.1179*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.0351*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0197** 
(-2.06) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* 
m2 -1.19 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
# observations 40,886 40,886 40,886 40,886 40,886 
# firms 10,375 10,375 10,375 10,375 10,375 
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Table III. Leverage and corporate performance in different legal origins 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales adjusted in each year. LEV is the industry-adjusted ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and 
long-term debt) and the book value of total assets in each year measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance. DID is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry at the 3-digit SIC level is negative and the median 
stock return is below -30 percent. LOF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is of French legal origin, and 0 
otherwise. All the continuous variables have been standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0029 (0.10) 
0.0307 
(0.48) 
-0.0316 
(-0.70) 
-0.0389 
(-0.87) 
0.0914 
(1.23) 
0.0572 
(0.59) 
VOPt-1 
-0.5182*** 
(-9.10) 
-0.4778*** 
(-34.02) 
-0.4725*** 
(-57.36) 
-0.1296 
(-0.50) 
-0.4333*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.4899*** 
(-40.13) 
SALES 0.3644*** (2.71) 
0.7336 
(1.20) 
0.0565 
(0.48) 
0.5831 
(1.11) 
-0.0475 
(-0.20) 
0.7009*** 
(2.65) 
PROFIT 0.7672*** (19.16) 
0.5033*** 
(35.10) 
0.4687*** 
(60.26) 
0.2787 
(0.99) 
0.4637** 
(2.19) 
0.5523*** 
(12.80) 
INVEST -0.0203 (-0.47) 
0.0048 
(0.10) 
-0.0035 
(-0.11) 
0.0424 
(0.57) 
0.1679 
(1.20) 
0.0604 
(1.02) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.0784*** (-2.73) 
-0.1053 
(-0.96) 
-0.1864*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.0444 
(-0.48) 
0.0885 
(0.98) 
-0.1112** 
(-1.99) 
LEV -0.0010 (-0.58) 
-0.0133 
(-1.27) 
-0.0046** 
(-2.08) 
-0.0189 
(-1.05) 
-0.0128* 
(-1.68) 
-0.0058 
(-1.31) 
DID 0.1465*** (5.60) 
0.0170 
(0.58) 
-0.0246 
(-0.52) 
0.0405 
(1.41) 
0.0333 
(0.64) 
0.1201*** 
(4.68) 
LEV x DID -0.0902*** (-3.47) 
0.0389 
(1.61) 
0.0964** 
(2.33) 
0.0391 
(1.12) 
0.0449 
(0.70) 
-0.0584*** 
(-3.14) 
LEV x LOF 
     -0.0003 
(-0.06) 
DID x LOF 
     -0.1105*** 
(-3.01) 
LEV x DID x LOF 
     0.1621*** 
(3.41) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -6.44*** -1.20 -1.13 -0.82 -0.33 -1.73* 
m2 -3.20** -1.08 -1.04 -0.68 -1.25 -1.18 
# observations 21,499 19,361 6,658 10,804 1,899 40,860 
# firms 5,238 5,132 1,761 2,898 473 10,370 
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Table IV. Leverage and corporate performance according to financial structure and development 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales in each year. LEV is the industry-adjusted ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term 
debt) and the book value of total assets in each year measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance. DID is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry at the 3-digit SIC level is negative and the median stock return 
is below -30 percent. FS is a proxy of the financial structure of the country. FS is measured in Column (1) by STRUCT, in Column (2) by 
MARKET and in Column (3) by BANK WEIGHT. STRUCT is a proxy of the market-orientation of the country’s financial system. MARKET is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is a market-based financial system, and 0 otherwise. BANK WEIGHT is the ratio between the 
private credit by deposit money banks and the value of listed shares. BC measures bank concentration and is the fraction of bank assets 
held by the three largest commercial banks in the country. FD is measured in Column (5) by FINAN and in Column (6) by DEVELOP. FINAN 
measures the country’s financial development. DEVELOP is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is a financially 
developed economy, and 0 otherwise. All the continuous variables have been standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0891 (0.83) 
0.0878 
(0.82) 
0.0866 
(0.83) 
0.0565 
(0.59) 
0.0897 
(0.83) 
0.0901 
(0.82) 
VOPt-1 
-0.4888*** 
(-41.34) 
-0.4907*** 
(-40.25) 
-0.4909*** 
(-40.21) 
-0.4898*** 
(-40.27) 
-0.4890*** 
(-41.56) 
-0.4904*** 
(-39.91) 
SALES 0.6777** (2.18) 
0.6792*** 
(2.57) 
0.6728** 
(2.49) 
0.7092*** 
(2.66) 
0.6701** 
(2.16) 
0.6738** 
(2.50) 
PROFIT 0.5512*** (13.24) 
0.5520*** 
(12.82) 
0.5516*** 
(12.79) 
0.5522*** 
(12.78) 
0.5515*** 
(13.23) 
0.5519*** 
(12.89) 
INVEST 0.0355 (0.66) 
0.0593 
(1.00) 
0.0592 
(1.01) 
0.0611 
(1.03) 
0.0367 
(0.68) 
0.0587 
(0.99) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.1113** (-1.97) 
-0.1111* 
(-1.93) 
-0.1094* 
(-1.93) 
-0.1106* 
(-1.95) 
-0.1111** 
(-1.96) 
-0.1122** 
(-1.99) 
LEV -0.0059 (-1.47) 
-0.0172 
(-1.22) 
-0.0058 
(-1.50) 
-0.0064 
(-1.51) 
-0.0064 
(-1.61) 
-0.0048 
(-1.32) 
DID 0.0845*** (3.42) 
-0.0193 
(-0.65) 
0.0942*** 
(4.18) 
0.0919*** 
(3.93) 
0.0703*** 
(2.73) 
-0.1196 
(-1.41) 
LEV x DID -0.0241 (-1.36) 
0.0721** 
(2.07) 
-0.0383** 
(-2.18) 
-0.0325* 
(-1.81) 
-0.0094 
(-0.45) 
0.0646 
(0.50) 
LEV x FS 0.0051 (0.87) 
0.0164 
(1.06) 
-0.0117 
(-0.84)    
DID x FS 0.0811*** (4.43) 
0.1709*** 
(3.78) 
-0.0851*** 
(-3.84)    
LEV x DID x FS -0.0546*** (-3.31) 
-0.1612*** 
(-3.65) 
0.0717*** 
(2.68)    
LEV x BC    -0.0043 (-1.18)   
DID x BC    -0.0494*** (-3.14)   
LEV x DID x BC    0.0470*** (2.91)   
LEV x FD     0.0028 (1.19) 
-0.0014 
(-0.20) 
DID x FD     0.1067*** (4.75) 
0.2465*** 
(2.83) 
LEV x DID x FD     -0.0904*** (-3.41) 
-0.1164 
(-0.89) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -1.70* -1.72* -1.71* -1.73* -1.70* -1.72* 
m2 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
# observations 38,748 39,553 38,925 40,761 38,887 39,553 
# firms 9,938 9,990 9,976 10,368 9,939 9,990 
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Table V. Leverage and corporate performance according to institutional and legal characteristics 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales in each year. LEV is the industry-adjusted ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term 
debt) and the book value of total assets in each year measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance. DID is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry at the 3-digit SIC level is negative and the median stock return 
is below -30 percent. CRED is an index that measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. ANTIDIRECTOR is the index of 
shareholder rights elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998). RIGHTS is the index of private property rights published by the Heritage 
Foundation. LE is the annual index of law and order of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). All the continuous variables have been 
standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0918 (0.84) 
0.0873 
(0.84) 
0.0910 
(0.84) 
0.0565 
(0.59) 
0.0919 
(0.85) 
0.0920 
(0.84) 
VOPt-1 
-0.4896*** 
(-40.02) 
-0.4900*** 
(-40.44) 
-0.4898*** 
(-40.05) 
-0.4896*** 
(-40.01) 
-0.4897*** 
(-40.02) 
-0.4898*** 
(-40.16) 
SALES 0.7006*** (2.63) 
0.7017*** 
(2.74) 
0.7092*** 
(2.67) 
0.7068*** 
(2.65) 
0.7008*** 
(2.61) 
0.7101*** 
(2.62) 
PROFIT 0.5522*** (12.84) 
0.5524** 
(12.77) 
0.5523*** 
(12.86) 
0.5522*** 
(12.86) 
0.5523*** 
(12.84) 
0.5523*** 
(12.82) 
INVEST 0.0603 (1.02) 
0.0608 
(1.02) 
0.0603 
(1.02) 
0.0602 
(1.01) 
0.0602 
(1.02) 
0.0603 
(1.02) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.1114** (-1.99) 
-0.1123** 
(-1.98) 
-0.1133** 
(-2.01) 
-0.1130** 
(-2.02) 
-0.1114** 
(-1.99) 
-0.1119** 
(-2.00) 
LEV -0.0057* (-1.66) 
-0.0076 
(-1.46) 
-0.0057 
(-1.57) 
-0.0058 
(-1.61) 
-0.0057 
(-1.59) 
-0.0075 
(-1.27) 
DID 0.1006*** (3.94) 
0.0809*** 
(3.94) 
0.0944*** 
(3.94) 
0.0862*** 
(3.55) 
0.0945*** 
(3.71) 
0.0851*** 
(3.84) 
LEV x DID -0.0457** (-2.26) 
-0.0252 
(-1.52) 
-0.0325* 
(-1.91) 
-0.0269 
(-1.50) 
-0.0499** 
(-2.22) 
-0.0306 
(-1.47) 
LEV x CRED -0.0007 (-0.26)    
-0.0016 
(-0.42)  
DID x CRED -0.0220 (-0.97)    
-0.0401 
(-1.33)  
LEV x DID x CRED -0.0036 (-0.16)    
-0.0077 
(-0.24)  
LEV x ANTIDIRECTOR/RIGHTS  0.0108 (1.07) 
-0.0015 
(-0.51)   
0.0046 
(0.73) 
DID x ANTIDIRECTOR/RIGHTS  0.00877*** (4.20) 
0.0779*** 
(3.76)   
0.0686** 
(2.34) 
LEV x DID x ANTIDIRECTOR/RIGHTS  -0.0866*** (-3.75) 
-0.0751*** 
(-3.07)   
-0.0500* 
(-1.70) 
LEV x LE    -0.0008 (-0.31)   
DID x LE    0.0800*** (3.84)   
LEV x DID x LE    -0.0623*** (-2.67)   
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -1.73* -1.73* -1.72* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* 
m2 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
# observations 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 
# firms 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 
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Table VI. Leverage and corporate performance. Robustness (I) 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales in each year. LEV is the industry-adjusted ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term 
debt) and the book value of total assets in each year measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance (Columns (1) to 
(4)). Alternatively, LEV has been measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the deciles 8 to 10 of 
leverage, and 0 otherwise (Columns (5) to (8)). DID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry 
at the 3-digit SIC level is negative and the median stock return is below -30 percent (Columns (5) to (8)), -20 percent (Columns (1) to (4)). 
LOF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is of French legal origin, and 0 otherwise. CRED is an index that measures 
the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. ANTIDIRECTOR is the index of shareholder rights elaborated by La Porta et al. 
(1998). LE is the annual index of law and order of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). All the continuous variables have been 
standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.0568 (0.59) 
0.0923 
(0.84) 
0.0899 
(0.86) 
0.0911 
(0.84) 
0.0577 
(0.59) 
0.0936 
(0.85) 
0.0963 
(0.86) 
0.0931 
(0.85) 
VOPt-1 -0.4900*** (-40.19) 
-0.4897*** 
(-40.07) 
-0.4901*** 
(-40.51) 
-0.4899*** 
(-40.13) 
-0.4889*** 
(-39.41) 
-0.4888*** 
(-39.35) 
-0.4888*** 
(-39.46) 
-0.4888*** 
(-39.38) 
SALES 0.6996*** (2.67) 
0.7049*** 
(2.65) 
0.7051*** 
(2.75) 
0.7125*** 
(2.68) 
0.7124*** 
(2.66) 
0.7107*** 
(2.64) 
0.7288*** 
(2.71) 
0.7246*** 
(2.67) 
PROFIT 0.5524*** (12.82) 
0.5523*** 
(12.86) 
0.5524*** 
(12.78) 
0.5523*** 
(12.86) 
0.5519*** 
(12.85) 
0.5520*** 
(12.89) 
0.5519*** 
(12.88) 
0.5520*** 
(12.90) 
INVEST 0.0606 (1.02) 
0.0607 
(1.03) 
0.0607 
(1.02) 
0.0610 
(1.03) 
0.0591 
(0.98) 
0.0582 
(0.98) 
0.0592 
(0.99) 
0.0588 
(0.98) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.1113** (-1.99) 
-0.1123** 
(-2.00) 
-0.1115** 
(-1.97) 
-0.1134** 
(-2.02) 
-0.1139** 
(-2.09) 
-0.1142** 
(-2.07) 
-0.1170** 
(-2.11) 
-0.1160** 
(-2.10) 
LEV -0.0055 (-1.23) 
-0.0053 
(-1.50) 
-0.0073 
(-1.37) 
-0.0054 
(-1.49) 
-0.0025 
(-0.73) 
-0.0037 
(-1.12) 
-0.0030 
(-1.03) 
-0.0032 
(-1.06) 
DID 0.0927* (4.86) 
0.0768*** 
(4.29) 
0.0741*** 
(4.52) 
0.0714*** 
(3.93) 
0.1396*** 
(4.94) 
0.1176*** 
(4.27) 
0.0998*** 
(4.27) 
0.1035*** 
(3.99) 
LEV x DID -0.0408*** (-3.00) 
-0.0324** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0297* 
(-2.21) 
-0.0285** 
(-2.31) 
-0.1347*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.1165*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.0947*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.0932*** 
(-2.86) 
LEV x LOF 0.0001 (0.01)    
-0.0043 
(-0.48)    
DID x LOF -0.0909*** (-4.43)    
-0.1712*** 
(-4.58)    
LEV x DID x LOF 0.0399* (1.79)    
0.3732*** 
(5.46)    
LEV x CRED  -0.0011 (-0.38)    
-0.0025 
(-0.56)   
DID x CRED  -0.0233 (-1.52)    
-0.0238 
(-0.93)   
LEV x DID x CRED  0.0189 (1.29)    
-0.0078 
(-0.21)   
LEV x ANTIDIRECTOR   0.0110 (1.06)    
0.0090 
(0.97)  
DID x ANTIDIRECTOR   0.0627*** (3.26)    
0.1059*** 
(4.26)  
LEV x DID x ANTIDIRECTOR   -0.0527** (-2.56)    
-0.1027*** 
(-2.76)  
LEV x LE    -0.0010 (-0.38)    
-0.0006 
(-0.20) 
DID x LE    0.0556*** (4.51)    
01006*** 
(4.47) 
LEV x DID x LE    -0.0219* (-1.83)    
-0.1353*** 
(-3.28) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* -1.73* 
m2 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
# observations 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 40,860 
# firms 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 
 
  
 37 
Table VII. Leverage and corporate performance. Robustness (II) 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales in each year. LEV is the ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term debt) and the 
book value of total assets adjusted by industry and country measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance. DID is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry at the 3-digit SIC level is negative and the median 
stock return is below -30 percent. LOF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is of French legal origin, and 0 
otherwise. CRED is an index that measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. ANTIDIRECTOR is the index of 
shareholder rights elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998). LE is the annual index of law and order of the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). All the continuous variables have been standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.1049 (0.97) 
0.1052 
(0.97) 
0.1349 
(1.19) 
0.0957 
(0.95) 
0.1054 
(0.97) 
VOPt-1 
-0.4708*** 
(-14.28) 
-0.4709*** 
(-14.31) 
-0.4709*** 
(-14.33) 
-0.4709*** 
(-14.27) 
-0.4707*** 
(-14.24) 
SALES -0.4521 (-0.51) 
-0.4481 
(-0.51) 
-0.4505 
(-0.51) 
-0.4363 
(-0.49) 
-0.4525 
(-0.51) 
PROFIT 0.5535*** (12.79) 
0.5536*** 
(12.76) 
0.5536*** 
(12.78) 
0.5537*** 
(12.72) 
0.5535*** 
(12.81) 
INVEST -0.0231 (-0.75) 
-0.0230 
(-0.75) 
-0.0230 
(-0.75) 
-0.0236 
(-0.76) 
-0.0231 
(-0.75) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.0381 (-0.50) 
-0.0383 
(-0.50) 
-0.0371 
(-0.48) 
-0.0410 
(-0.53) 
-0.0384 
(-0.50) 
LEV -0.0043* (-1.74) 
-0.0047 
(-1.27) 
-0.0045* 
(-1.72) 
-0.0021 
(-1.45) 
-0.0043* 
(-1.69) 
DID 0.0527* (1.67) 
0.0628* 
(1.87) 
0.0533* 
(1.74) 
0.0407 
(1.63) 
0.0422 
(1.48) 
LEV x DID -0.0618** (-2.49) 
-0.0785*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.0647 
(-2.90) 
-0.0573*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.0452** 
(-2.20) 
LEV x LOF  0.0016 (0.25)    
DID x LOF  -0.0557 (-1.61)    
LEV x DID x LOF  0.1436** (2.13)    
LEV x CRED   -0.0051 (-1.05)   
DID x CRED   0.0141 (0.53)   
LEV x DID x CRED   0.0172 (0.92)   
LEV x ANTIDIRECTOR    0.0120 (1.29)  
DID x ANTIDIRECTOR    0.0178 (0.48)  
LEV x DID x ANTIDIRECTOR    -0.0682*** (-2.97)  
LEV x LE     -0.0006 (-0.29) 
DID x LE     0.0172 (0.52) 
LEV x DID x LE     -0.0725*** (-3.97) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -1.78* -1.78* -1.78* -1.78* -1.78* 
m2 -1.19 -1.19 -1.19 -1.18 -1.19 
# observations 41,320 41,293 41,293 41,293 41,293 
# firms 10,435 10,429 10,429 10,429 10,429 
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Table VIII. Leverage and corporate performance. Robustness (III) 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variables. The dependent variable (VOP) is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses 
and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in performance. SALES is the lagged natural logarithm of total 
sales. PROFIT is the industry-adjusted lagged ratio between EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions in each year. INVEST is the 
industry-adjusted lagged ratio between new investments and total assets in each year. ASSET SALE RATE is the industry-adjusted lagged 
ratio of divestitures on sales in each year. LEV is the exogenous component of firm leverage ratio, using profitability, growth opportunities, 
tangible assets, and size as instruments. DID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry at the 
3-digit SIC level is negative and the median stock return is below -30 percent. LOF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
country is of French legal origin, and 0 otherwise. CRED is an index that measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. 
ANTIDIRECTOR is the index of shareholder rights elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998). LE is the annual index of law and order of the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). All the continuous variables have been standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.2168 (1.28) 
0.1970 
(1.09) 
0.2269 
(1.25) 
0.5104 
(1.12) 
0.2003 
(1.14) 
VOPt-1 
-0.4712*** 
(-13.99) 
-0.4712*** 
(-13.96) 
-0.4715*** 
(-14.08) 
-0.4725*** 
(-14.25) 
-0.4711*** 
(-13.96) 
SALES -0.1887*** (-2.78) 
-0.1873*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.1903*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.1941*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.1897*** 
(-2.77) 
PROFIT 1.1148*** (12.86) 
1.1142*** 
(12.97) 
1.1150*** 
(12.83) 
1.1176*** 
(12.67) 
1.1140*** 
(12.92) 
INVEST -0.0188 (-0.64) 
-0.0188 
(-0.64) 
-0.0182 
(-0.62) 
-0.0186 
(-0.64) 
-0.0185 
(-0.63) 
ASSET SALE RATE -0.0787 (-0.86) 
-0.0811 
(-0.91) 
-0.0777 
(-0.86) 
-0.0821 
(-0.90) 
-0.0790 
(-0.87) 
LEV -0.3842 (-1.38) 
-0.4380 
(-1.25) 
-0.3192 
(-1.55) 
-2.7538 
(-1.14) 
0.9414 
(1.37) 
DID 0.1762*** (2.90) 
0.2224*** 
(3.34) 
0.1203 
(0.88) 
-0.7710*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.9171*** 
(-3.36) 
LEV x DID -0.4936** (-2.02) 
-0.6525** 
(-2.42) 
-0.2731 
(-0.47) 
3.2223*** 
(3.86) 
3.5532*** 
(3.45) 
LEV x LOF  0.2618 (0.51)    
DID x LOF  -0.4853** (-2.53)    
LEV x DID x LOF  1.8477** (2.01)    
LEV x CRED   -0.0352 (-0.77)   
DID x CRED   0.0284 (0.39)   
LEV x DID x CRED   -0.1088 (-0.37)   
LEV x ANTIDIRECTOR    0.6263 (1.10)  
DID x ANTIDIRECTOR    0.2684*** (4.12)  
LEV x DID x ANTIDIRECTOR    -1.1037*** (-4.33)  
LEV x LE     -0.1505 (-1.47) 
DID x LE     0.1279*** (3.59) 
LEV x DID x LE     -0.4842*** (-3.46) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1 -1.78* -1.77* -1.78* -1.76* -1.77* 
m2 1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
# observations 41,308 41,281 41,281 41,281 41,281 
# firms 10,437 10,431 10,431 10,431 10,431 
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Appendix A. Variables 
The table shows the definition of variables used in the paper and their sources. 
Name Definition Source 
 OPERATING PERFORMANCE  
VOP The variation in operating performance is the change in the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes 
plus depreciation expenses and provisions adjusted by removing the 3-digit SIC industry mean change in 
performance. The variation in operating performance is measured over a two-year period centered around the 
base year. 
Worldscope 
 LEVERAGE  
LEV The ratio between the book value of financial debt (short- and long-term debt) and the book value of total 
assets adjusted by industry removing the 3-digit SIC industry leverage ratio in each year. The leverage ratio is 
measured two years prior to the first date of operating performance. 
Worldscope 
 ECONOMICALLY DISTRESSED INDUSTRIES  
DID A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry at the 3-digit SIC level is 
negative and the median stock returns is below -30 percent / -20 percent /-10 percent. 
Worldscope 
 COUNTRY VARIABLES  
LOF A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is of French legal origin, and 0 otherwise. La Porta et al., 
(1998) 
STRUCT The first principal component of two variables that measure the comparative activity and size of markets and 
banks. Each of the underlying components is constructed so that higher values indicate more market-based 
financial systems. The first component is the natural logarithm of the ratio of value traded to bank credit. Value 
traded equals the value of stock transactions as a share of national output. Bank credit equals the claims of the 
banking sector on the private sector as a share of GDP. The second component equals the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of market capitalization to bank credit. Market capitalization is defined as the value-listed shares 
divided by GDP, and is a measure of the size of stock markets relative to the economy. 
Financial Structure 
and Economic 
Database (Beck et 
al., 2006) 
MARKET A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is a market-based financial system, and 0 otherwise. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) 
BANK WEIGHT The ratio between the private credit by deposit money banks and the value of listed shares. Financial Structure 
and Economic 
Database (Beck et 
al., 2006) 
BC The fraction of bank assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country. World Bank 
Database 
FINAN The first principal component of two underlying measures of financial development. The first is a measure of 
the overall activity of financial intermediaries and markets. It equals the natural logarithm of the product of 
private credit (the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP) and value 
traded (the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP). Private credit includes 
credits by both bank and non-bank intermediaries. The second is a measure of the overall size of the financial 
sector and equals the natural logarithm of the sum of private credit and market capitalization. 
Financial Structure 
and Economic 
Database (Beck et 
al., 2006) 
DEVELOP A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is a financially developed economy, and 0 otherwise. 
A country has an underdeveloped financial system if: (1) claims of deposit money banks on the private 
sector/GDP are less than the sample mean; and (2) the total value traded as a share of GDP is less than the 
sample mean. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) 
CREDITORS This index measures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, such as 
creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are able to seize their 
collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved, i.e., whether there is no automatic stay or asset 
freeze imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a 
bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an administrator, and not management, is responsible for running the business 
during the reorganization. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide 
each of these powers to secured lenders; it consequently varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong 
creditor rights). 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
ANTIDIRECTOR An index formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholder’s meeting, (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. 
La Porta et al., 
(1998) 
RIGHTS An indicator of the degree to which private property rights are protected and the degree to which government 
enforces laws that protect private property. It also accounts for the possibility that private property may be 
expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of 
individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges between 1 and 5. We reverse the scale of the original 
index, so that a high score indicates greater legal protection of property. 
Heritage Foundation 
LE The annual index of law and order of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This ranges from 0 to 10, with 
a higher figure indicating better quality and enforcement of the legal system. 
ICRG published by 
the Political Risk 
Service Group 
FIRM CONTROL VARIABLES 
 40 
SALES The natural logarithm of lagged total sales. Worldscope 
PROFIT The prior profitability of the firm adjusted by industry (3-digit SIC level). Profitability is measured as the ratio 
between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions 
from earnings). 
Worldscope 
INVEST The prior investment rate of the firm adjusted by industry (3-digit SIC level). The investment rate is measured as 
the ratio between new investments and total assets. 
Worldscope 
ASSET SALE RATE The asset sale rate of the firm adjusted by industry (3-digit SIC level). The asset sale rate is measured as the 
lagged ratio of divestitures on sales.  
Worldscope 
 
 
